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Trade Union Participation in CSR Deliberation: An Evaluation 
1) Introduction 
Holding contemporary corporations to account for their social and environmental impacts 
presents increasingly complex problems, as recent examples of corporate irresponsibility 
demonstrate (e.g. the Volkswagen emissions scandal, Deep Water Horizon, Rana Plaza 
Collapse) (see The Guardian, 2015; Barron, 2012; Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015). The 
geographic scope, technological uncertainty, and multiple layers of governance associated 
with many social and environmental issues make attributing and enforcing accountability 
extremely challenging (Ramasastry, 2015). Such challenges present particular problems for 
government regulatory agencies whose role in defining and enforcing appropriate business 
conduct has been fundamentally undermined by the growth of global economic 
transactions that are often conducted beyond the legislative ambit of the nation state, so 
that the nation state ceases to be the ‘legal and moral point of reference’ (Scherer and 
Palazzo 2011: 905). Difficulties in regulating responsible conduct are especially profound in 
relation to multi-national companies (MNCs), which have been subject to particular scrutiny 
in relation to their global social responsibilities (Baumann-Pauly et al, 2013). In response, 
there has been an increase in the range of business and civil-society led approaches towards 
improving social responsibility including self-regulatory, partnership and collaborative 
approaches (Campbell, 2007). The growth of these phenomena raises significant questions 
regarding the composition, organisation, and effectiveness of alternatives to formal 
regulation, and of the potential and limits to such approaches to holding large, multi-
national companies to account.  
2 
 
The concept of political Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), developed by Scherer and 
Palazzo (2007; 2011), provides a locus for the argument we present in this paper. Political 
CSR is proposed in response to the view that the nation state is no longer a sufficient 
creator and enforcer of the ‘rules of the game’ by which businesses must play. The MNC 
ensures that CSR is now a global phenomenon. It is the MNC that is well placed to 
contribute to CSR because ‘involvement of private and public actors may help to better 
consider the involved interests, to combine the best available knowledge and resources, and 
to enhance the capacity to enforce standards or to implement policies’ (Scherer and Palazzo 
2011: 910). The incorporation of corporations into the processes through which socially 
appropriate business conduct is determined also addresses the difficulty of enforcing ‘hard 
law’, because MNCs are likely to be inclined to participate in and adhere to outcomes so as 
to demonstrate their moral legitimacy in a climate where both cognitive and pragmatic 
legitimacy have diminished (ibid: 916). Significantly, moral legitimacy is demonstrable in the 
extent to which decision-making is based on discourse so that policy is the product of 
‘forceless force of the better argument’ (ibid: 916).  
Central to political CSR is the participation of actors with the capacity and moral authority to 
hold business to account in processes of deliberation. While discursive resources are of 
primary importance within deliberative processes, there is some recognition that moral 
legitimacy might be insufficient to ensure that deliberative outcomes are held to in practice. 
For example, in their discussion of the moral legitimacy of the non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) as a deliberative partner in political CSR, Baur and Palazzo (2011: 592) 
acknowledge that the NGO must occasionally resort to using ‘more common weapons of the 
political area if they encounter unfavourable circumstances such as hostility of powerful 
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actors’. We argue that the ability to effectively use ‘non-discursive methods’ in the face of 
resistance from powerful MNCs (i.e., the efficacy of partners in deliberative processes) does 
not necessarily undermine the legitimacy of such partners in deliberation. Specifically, we 
propose that political CSR requires of the firm that it engages in deliberation with both a 
legitimate and effective deliberative partner. Therefore, an important contribution of this 
paper is the distinction that is made between the legitimacy and the efficacy of the 
deliberative partner(s) that engage with the firm in the deliberative processes that generate 
political CSR. The process of deliberation between firm and its deliberative partners in 
relation to political CSR provides the point of departure in this paper as we critically 
evaluate the potential role of trade unions in relation to deliberative processes that 
encourage more responsible business conduct. 
The role played by trade unions in CSR is an area of study that is underdeveloped and whilst 
there are welcome related contributions, these are largely exploratory and empirical in 
character (see Preuss et al., 2015). For example, research concerned with CSR and unions 
has: explored union and other stakeholder perceptions of how unions might contribute to 
CSR (Delbard, 2011); considered the way in which union involvement has shaped business 
responses to various issues with mixed results (Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2006; 
Fredricksson and Gaston, 1999; Rassier 2006); and set out a manifesto for future research 
on union contributions to CSR (Preuss et al., 2006; Preuss et al., 2009). A major gap in 
research on trade unions and CSR is the absence of nuanced conceptualisations both of the 
potential for and limitations of union involvement in CSR. In response, we conceptualise the 
potential role of unions in CSR through the lens of deliberative democracy.  
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2. Deliberative Democracy as a Foundation for Political CSR 
For some time now, scholars have questioned the appetite, if not the ability, of certain 
countries to ‘tame the activities of MNCs’, for example, through the introduction of ‘legal 
measures that may inhibit corporate investment or may cause MNCs to relocate to more 
hospitable countries’ (Shamir 2004: 637; see also Graham and Woods 2006). Moreover, 
scholars have pointed to the inadequacy of national institutions and regulations to deal with 
the scale and growth of cross-border economic transaction and movement leading to 
‘governance gaps’ (Marginson 2016: 1035; see also, Voegtlin and Pless 2014). In sum, the 
‘law and the state apparatus are insufficient means for the integration of business activities 
with societal concerns’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007: 1101) and that ‘neither nation-states nor 
international institutions alone are able to sufficiently regulate the global economy and to 
provide global public goods’ (2011: 900).  
Consequently, new institutional, multilevel, arrangements have emerged and operate 
concomitantly with established institutions (Marginson 2016). For instance, firms are 
contributing to and operating in accordance with civil regulation or ‘private, non-state, or 
market-based regulatory frameworks’ (Vogel, 2007: 5) in order to ‘compensate for some of 
the shortcomings of national and international state governance’ (Vogel, 2007: 4). Whereas 
civil regulation usually involves non-business constituents, and specific standards are 
introduced in response to pressure from an external source such as consumer sanction, civil 
regulation is invariably influenced by the motives of senior management ‘whose stakes may 
be ethically questionable’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007: 1099). In response to this, Scherer 
and Palazzo propose deliberative democracy, whereby ‘the legitimacy of a political decision 
rests on the discursive quality of the decision making’ (2007: 1107) so that legitimate 
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decision-making is based on discussion with collective associations such as NGOs. In the 
absence of sufficient national and international legislation, political CSR arguably ensures a 
check on the interests of the firm whose agents must justify its policies in the course of 
deliberation with deliberative partners or else change them. The democratic credentials of 
particular deliberative partners are of paramount import and therefore, legitimacy emerges 
as a first criterion for the assessment of the normative appropriateness of possible 
deliberative partners within deliberative democracy. 
Deliberation should be rational and free from the influence of force or coercion and the 
outcome determined by reason and the power of the better argument. In principle, 
coercion is anathema to deliberative democracy, which is based on the ‘uncoercive force of 
reason’ (Ott, 2012: 578). However, that reason determines the outcome of discussion is 
compatible with the use of coercion post deliberation in order to ensure that the outcome 
of deliberation is manifest in policy decisions. Indeed, this may be necessary where there is 
an asymmetry of power between the parties in deliberation and where the outcome of 
deliberation contradicts the interests of the more powerful group. Therefore, partners in 
deliberative processes must also be effective in ensuring that the outcomes of the 
deliberative process are realised. 
In the absence of efficacy to ensure adherence to the outcome of deliberation, there is the 
possibility, if not probability, that policy decisions are nonetheless based on specific 
interests (of the powerful). Political CSR pits the might of the MNC (themselves ‘disturbingly 
powerful lobbies’, Crouch 2009: 52), against others in the global economy where the former 
‘occupy a more directly regulatory role’ (ibid: 50). Coercion as a means of imposing one’s 
will is clearly at odds with deliberative democracy, however, post hoc coercion so that the 
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outcomes of deliberation are reflected in policy is critical to political CSR. It is therefore 
important that deliberative partners involved in political CSR can exert pressure on the MNC 
independently of the formal regulatory system so that the policy outcomes of deliberation 
better reflect the process of deliberation. The next section evaluates the trade union 
according to the criteria of suitability for participation in political CSR.  
 
3) CSR Deliberation: Legitimacy, Efficacy and the Trade Union 
 
  
The argument that trade unions are important stakeholders in the CSR and ethical strategies 
of the firm has been made elsewhere (see for example Brammer et al., 2012; Campbell 
2007; Rhodes and Harvey 2012; Yu 2009). It is important at this stage to define what we 
mean by the trade union. After all, there is considerable and persistent diversity: in the 
nature of trade unionism both internationally and intra-nationally (see, for example, 
Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013); in different strategies towards management, for 
instance militancy or moderation (Kelly 1996); and indeed in approaches towards members, 
as encapsulated in the servicing and organising debate (Heery, 2002: 27).  
It is worthwhile to provide a preliminary contrast of the position of trade unions vis-à-vis 
other actors with a stake in firms’ CSR practices. Existing research tends to juxtapose 
“internal” (“primary” or “normative”) stakeholders such as employees, customers, and 
investors with “external” (“secondary” or “derivative”) stakeholders such as community 
groups, NGOs, and the media (Laplume et al., 2008). Internal and external stakeholders 
differ in important respects in the extent and specificity of the resources they have 
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contributed to the firm, the extent to which they have assets at risk in the firm, and thus the 
legitimacy of their interest in the direction of the business (Phillips, 2003). Trade unions 
occupy a distinctive position in this landscape of stakeholders in that they are at once and 
the same time internal stakeholders (a significant stake in the success, continuity, and 
growth of businesses, formalised channels of voice and interaction) and external 
stakeholders (formal/structural independence from the firm, contrasting interests with the 
firm in some areas, somewhat narrower issue/advocacy interests). Since CSR involves 
navigating a balance between various forms and domains of responsibility (Schwartz and 
Carroll, 2003), we argue that trade unions are well-placed to encourage pro-social business 
conduct that is mindful of economic imperatives for business success as well as avoiding the 
excesses of some extreme single-issue activists. Given the myriad differences between 
unions, our analysis is largely based on a normative account of the trade union and focus on 
the unifying themes of trade unionism, that trade unions are independent from the firm; 
principally motivated to represent workers’ interests; and committed to democratic internal 
processes (see Hodder and Edwards, 2015).  
 
Legitimacy of the Trade Union 
The legitimacy of the partner in the deliberative process is of paramount importance both in 
general and specifically in relation to establishing norms of conduct in respect of social and 
environmental issues. Legitimacy is in large part a matter of perspective (Chaison and 
Bigelow, 2002; Dussel 2013; see also Koch 2015: 13). Widespread absence of trade union 
recognition and employer hostility towards trade unions (see Cullinane and Dundon 2013) 
demonstrate the perspective of corporations towards trade union legitimacy, while the 
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Trade Union Act (2016) exemplifies the perspective of the current Conservative government 
in the UK. However, our concern here is not to consider the legitimacy of the trade union 
per se, but the legitimacy of the trade union to be involved in deliberation over CSR. As 
such, we consider the democratic nature of trade unionism, the broader social contribution 
made by the trade union, and the presence of incentive alignment that illustrate the 
positive role that unions might play in relation to CSR.  
Trade unions are democratic organisations whereby the will of the membership is expressed 
through ballot on all issues such as the representatives and leadership. Criticism of trade 
union susceptibility to the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ has been refuted theoretically (Gouldner, 
1964; Kelly and Heery, 1994), while the ‘iron law of democracy’ has been demonstrated by 
trade unions in the UK (Evans et al., 2012). Trade unions are both democratic agents and 
agents of democracy (see Erman 2013) in that they provide a countervailing force to 
absolutism in industry, which can lead ‘to a number of pernicious and socially injurious 
outcomes’ (Kaufman, 2000: 189). Or as Erne puts it, trade unions ‘also consolidate political 
democracy by holding corporations accountable when they subject citizens, as they 
frequently do, to autocratic rule in the production process or colonize the democratic 
process by pecuniary means’ (Erne 2008: 1). 
It has been argued that although well placed to represent their members, trade unions are 
not legitimate representatives of the interests of people beyond the firm. In other words 
there is a basis for the ‘validity of [trade union] voice on issues affecting their members – 
but not other issues’ (Bendell 2006: 38).  However, unions are also responsive to broader 
social concerns (see Hyman, 2001). For example, trade unions in the UK have worked closely 
with Amnesty International since the late 1970s not only collaborating on campaigns 
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concerning persecuted trade unionists, but also in support of broader social issues such as 
child labour (Myrstad 1999), Chinese democracy in the 1990s, and human rights in Columbia 
and other countries (see Heery 2009: 32-33). More recently, trade unions have been 
integral to the Living Wage campaign in the UK – the impact of which extends beyond the 
confines of trade union membership (see Heery et al., 2015: 21).    
We also point to the incentive alignment between firm and trade union in CSR deliberation. 
It is perhaps understandable that CSR is less likely where firms are experiencing poor 
financial performance and where the prospect of ‘near-term profitability is limited’ 
(Campbell 2007: 952). Indeed, it might be argued that adherence to CSR objectives in such 
an environment would ultimately lead to socially undesirable consequences, e.g., cessation 
of operations resulting in unemployment. Moreover, governmental appetite for CSR 
legislation is inhibited during economic crises because of any detrimental impact on 
economic recovery and the ability of the firm to compete. There may be reticence and 
indeed resistance to enacting legislation that imposes strictures on firms.  
Negotiation with a trade union, on the other hand, permits flexibility in response to societal 
demands. The trade union as steward of CSR continues to press the firm towards social and 
public goods, but is also well placed to understand the idiosyncratic [financial] pressures 
faced by the firm on occasion and to permit the temporary redirection of capital, which 
might include investment in CSR, in order to ensure the survival of the firm (arguably, a high 
ranking public good in terms of those employed within the firm). Ultimately then, the trade 
union can ensure that whereas the duration of the journey towards CSR may be longer and 
the direction of travel circuitous, the destination (CSR) does not change. 
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Effectiveness of the Trade Union 
Whilst we have established that the trade union is independent from the firm, it is also 
internal to it. After all, union members, where such exist, comprise a proportion of the 
workforce that participates in and contributes to the performance of the firm. Therefore, in 
terms of CSR, the efficacy of the trade union can be expressed both within the firm 
(internally) and beyond the firm (externally) and understood according to two dimensions: 
communication and mobilisation (see Figure 1). An example of internal communication is 
the channelling of CSR information between management and the employee, raising 
concerns expressed by employees to management for consideration and conveying 
managerial response and strategic decisions to employees. In this regard, the trade union 
can be seen by management as ‘more of a lubricant than an irritant’ (McCarthy and Parker, 
1968: 56). Collective voice is critical to the success of the firm for two very good reasons: 
first, that effective voice leads to participation and a beneficial impact on quality and 
productivity, and second, that it highlights problems that might otherwise fester or 
‘explode’ if unaddressed (Dundon et al., 2004: 1151). Trade union voice is expressed in 
terms of ‘internal firm governance and the national policy’ (Kaufman, 2005: 562), both of 
which are important in relation to achieving CSR. The trade union is already well situated to 
engage in deliberation given that its primary function is to negotiate with management on 
behalf of its members. As an internal voice mechanism, the trade union not only deliberates 
over CSR policy with senior management, but provides an effective conduit within the firm 
between the employees and management via which employees can raise ethical concerns 
without fear of reprisal, ‘providing a safe route for workers to report non-compliance’ 
(Ethical Trading Initiative, 2010: 1), that might result from individual/direct communication.  
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The trade union is distinct from the firm and unencumbered by the organisational 
constraints to which the HR function is beholden (see Collings and Wood, 2009: 5; Rhodes 
and Harvey 2012; Purcell and Ahlstrand 1994). Nevertheless, it is sufficiently engaged to 
observe the activities of the firm and to act proactively to influence decision making, 
challenging the prerogative of the agents of capital through collective voice, thereby 
potentially achieving ‘what the lone voice could never do’ (Prosser, 2001, cited in Dundon et 
al., 2004: 1151). To be clear, the trade union is well placed to monitor and respond to 
activities that contradict agreements reached through deliberative process, but also to 
challenge activities undertaken by the firm that have not featured for discussion during this 
process but which are socially irresponsible. We elaborate on this point by adapting Gemmill 
and Bamidele-Izu’s (2002) framework for civil society engagement with environmental 
governance. Through its involvement in the firm, the trade union has access to information 
that it is able to collate, analyse and subsequently present to management, its members and 
stakeholders outside of the firm. It is able to advocate for justice in the workplace and 
beyond, and influence firm policy towards this end. A broadly similar point is made by 
Dicken (2009: 6) of trade unions as ‘effective positive mediators’ of regulation within the 
workplace. In so doing, the trade union is able to mitigate against negative employee 
attribution by acting as an effective and reliable source of communication of the purpose of 
CSR, thereby avoiding the problems created by ineffectual communication (Du et al., 2010). 
Thereafter, it is able to closely monitor firm compliance with the CSR objectives set in a way 
that a wholly external organisation cannot.  
Unlike external organisations, the trade union is omnipresent through its members and 
therefore positioned to observe and announce instances of “greenwashing” or “corporate 
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citizenship façade” in order to oppose resolute miscreant managerial intent. The ability of 
any independent organisation to monitor the performance of the firm is questionable. Royle 
(2010: 16) refers to this as the ‘spotlight phenomenon’, but exposes the problems of such 
monitoring as both ‘roving and random’ (ibid; 18) as when one organisation is under the 
‘spotlight’, another may be free to behave as it wishes. In contrast, trade unions are well 
placed to identify non-compliance, ‘coordinating workers to monitor workplace practices’ 
(Ethical Trading Initiative, 2010: 1).  
If communication is insufficient in challenging corporate malfeasance then the trade union 
is able to resort to internal or external mobilisation of stakeholder support. For example, in 
articulating the particular ‘injustice’ as a means of inspiring collective action (see Kelly 1998: 
27), the trade union is able to mobilise the membership to impose sanctions on the firm. It 
is very difficult for senior management to ‘legitimate their actions’ according to rules (of 
law) or employee complicity (as wage taking participants) and yet more so in relation to 
beliefs about fairness (ibid) when activity fundamentally contravenes the most rudimentary 
shared notions of fairness. If it is unable to prevent miscreancy on the part of the firm 
through internal mobilisation, then the trade union might exert its political influence 
(external mobilisation) by drawing attention to geographically specific instances of 
corporate malfeasance to which the MNC is more susceptible (Scherer and Palazzo 2011). 
Externally, the trade union can communicate with the wider polity (Erne 2008), 
disseminating findings of its continuous monitoring of the firm so as to prevent instances of 
“greenwashing”. Where the trade union is unable to constrain managerial prerogative that 
might result in societal harm, it has the potential to mobilise political action.  
------------------------------------------- 
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
A final point to be made here is that the trade union is well placed to strive against and 
respond to ‘unintended effects’ (Edwards 2015a) of action taken, such as campaigns by the 
NGO and consumer sanction such as buy-cotts.  Neither of these actors is embedded within 
the firm and neither is especially well suited to influence the form that the corporate 
response takes. In contrast, through its representatives and in negotiation with 
management, the trade union may moderate the impact of the corporate response on the 
most vulnerable, for example, by engaging in concession bargaining.  
 
4) CSR Deliberation: Deficit of and Downsides for the Trade Union 
We argue above that the trade union represents a legitimate partner in deliberation with 
the firm towards CSR because it offers the opportunity for inclusion and participation to its 
members, whose interests represent those of wider society as the members comprise in 
part the demos. That said, there may be a stark contrast between the interests of working 
people as workers and as citizens and that ‘these terrains of interest may be in tension with 
each other’ (Edwards, 2015b: 179). Put another way, ‘moral judgements are always 
understood and expressed in a relativistic manner’ (Lukes, 2008: 25). Consequently, the 
trade union representing worker interests may have to work with employers (and their CSR 
practices) in sectors including tobacco (Fooks et al., 2011), tourism (Camilleri, 2014), arms 
(Cole, 1923; Donnelly and Scholarios, 1998), nuclear power (Räthzel and Uzzell, 2011), and 
the extractive industries (Mutti et al., 2012). In such sectors, there is arguably limited 
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alignment between the interests of the worker, as represented by their trade union, and 
wider society (see Vachon and Brecher, 2016). Since these sectors are associated with 
significant wider social and environmental externalities, this perhaps suggests a boundary 
condition to the capacity of unions to promote beneficial wider social and environmental 
outcomes. However, that an industry has such externalities does not preclude it from 
contributing in socially responsible ways that do not run contrary to the purpose of the firm. 
Trade unions representing workers in tobacco firms, for example, might press the firm for 
social responsibility in climate change or child poverty.  
Moreover, it has been suggested that the members of trade unions are primarily of a 
particular type, far from the cosmopolitan blend of the societies in which they are based i.e., 
‘pale, male and stale’ (Simms et al, 2013; 20). For some time now, scholarship has pointed 
to the failure of trade unions to attract younger workers (Hodder, 2014) and unions are still 
struggling to comprehensively engage with an ever increasing number of precarious workers 
(Heery and Abbott, 2000; Standing, 2011). Nevertheless, there is certainly evidence that 
trade unions are pursuing a strategy towards broadening their remit in order to encourage 
diversity in membership and achieving aims and objectives that have a broader societal 
impact (Frege and Kelly, 2004). Take, for instance, recent union strategies of engaging with 
local interest groups towards achieving societal goals at a macro level (and also to increase 
union membership), commonly referred to as community unionism (McBride and 
Greenwood, 2009), or, as stated above, trade union engagement with global pressure 
groups to do achieve the same ends, albeit at a macro level, or social movement unionism 
(Robinson, 2000; Heery 2009).    
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As for efficacy, the decline in trade union membership across the globe (Visser, 2006) 
undermines the argument that trade unions are able to coerce management to accept the 
outcomes of deliberation in their CSR policies. Certainly this trend indicates a diminution in 
the associational power of the trade union (Wright, 2000) and its ability to coerce 
management through traditional industrial relations channels.  
We now turn our attention to the important question of whether engagement in CSR 
deliberation is appropriate for organised labour. We do this by i) briefly exploring whether 
involvement in CSR deliberation is consistent with the economic objective of organised 
labour and ii) considering the possible implications of trade union involvement in CSR, 
namely in terms of members’ reactions.  
It has been suggested that unions exist ‘not to provide workers with an exercise in self-
government’ (Allen, 1954: 15) but ‘for the purpose of protecting and advancing the 
members’ economic interests in connection with their daily work’ (Cole, 1952: 13), 
‘regardless in general of political and social considerations, except in so far as these bear 
directly upon its own economic ends’ (Hoxie, 1923: 45). Subsequently, one might question 
whether the trade union is able to accommodate this economic function whilst 
concomitantly applying pressure on the firm to provide social goods beyond those that 
benefit the membership.  
Research has shown that the trade union can be effective in the representation of its 
membership and also in exerting ‘a major egalitarian influence on the British labour market’ 
(Metcalf et al., 2001: 74), thereby meeting the duality of what Flanders (1970: 15) identifies 
as representing ‘vested interests’ and acting as a ‘sword of justice’, albeit in a narrow sense 
with regards to the latter. However, engagement in CSR requires a broader remit of the 
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trade union than the national labour market, i.e., the nature and extent of injustice with 
which it must concern itself is much greater. Consequently, in endeavouring to meet the 
new demands incumbent upon it, the trade union may be less able to represent the 
interests of its members. For instance, CSR in relation to climate change – ‘a problem of 
production and consumption’ (Ajl, 2009) - presents a conundrum as it juxtaposes the trade 
union’s objectives of achieving vested interests, i.e., increasing production and labour, with 
its commitment to the environment, i.e. reducing production and labour. More generally, 
resources are finite and it is not hard to conceive of a situation wherein management 
present the trade union with a zero sum game whereby financial commitment to CSR or 
financial commitment to the workforce are offered as alternatives.  
In extremis, two outcomes are possible. First, there is the possibility that involvement in CSR 
deliberation might precipitate a decline in membership due to disaffection by the move 
away from its traditional function of representing the interest of members towards a 
stewardship of societal interests. Given the decline in trade union density across the globe, 
involvement in CSR deliberation is then potentially damaging to the labour movement. In 
contrast to this ominous perspective, there are grounds for optimism for involvement in CSR 
deliberation to revitalise trade union membership if the new ‘collective action frame’ 
(Gahan and Pakarek 2013) has greater resonance with the views of individuals formerly 
either indifferent to, or antagonistic towards, trade unions. Such a reframing of trade 
unionism opens the door to opportunity as well as threat, by demonstrating the relevance 
of trade unionism to those who might otherwise feel that trade unions are irrelevant for 
them (see, for example, Heery and Conley 2007: 13).  
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A second point is whether a wider role for unions in promoting CSR is more appropriate for 
certain trade unions than for others (inter-union suitability), or whether it is more 
appropriate for certain distinct occupational groups within trade unions than for other 
union members (intra-union suitability). If indeed it is the case that certain unions or certain 
occupational groups fit the role better than others, then any involvement in CSR becomes 
highly divisive and problematic at a macro level and thus the implications for the labour 
movement more generally require careful consideration. Moreover, trade unions are more 
likely to participate in CSR where there is legislative underpinning for trade union 
involvement, as in coordinated market economies (CME) (Preuss et al., 2006). Therefore, 
the trade union that pursues this strategy in a liberal market economy, without the 
legislative support found in CMEs and without understanding the effect of such a strategy 
on membership density does so at a considerable risk.  
5) Conclusion 
This paper responds to the burgeoning debate on political CSR (Scherer and Palazzo 2007; 
2011) that advocates for the MNC to play a more active and political role in CSR due to the 
limitations of legislation to constrain the behaviours of firms operating beyond the domestic 
or national context. At the heart of political CSR is a deliberative democratic process 
between the firm and broader stakeholder groups in order to determine CSR based on 
reasonable and logical discussion.  This paper makes several contributions to this debate by 
integrating the fledging study of trade union involvement in CSR. First, we use the political 
CSR debate to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the role of trade unions in 
CSR and document the legitimacy of the trade union to partner the firm in deliberative 
democracy towards CSR. Whereas the focus of scholarship has been on the legitimacy of the 
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partner in deliberative processes, we highlight that because of inevitable asymmetries in 
power in these relationships, i.e., dominance of the MNC, the efficacy of deliberative 
partners is critical ensuring that the outcomes of deliberation are realised in policy and 
practice. We establish the legitimacy of the trade union in deliberation with the firm 
according to the democratic nature of trade unionism (both an agent of democracy and a 
democratic agent), the embeddedness of unions within institutionalised voice channels, and 
the presence of incentive alignment contribute considerably to the positive role that unions 
might play in relation to CSR. However, a second contribution made in the paper is in its 
discussion of the importance of efficacy in deliberative democracy. We argue that the 
partner to the firm must not only be legitimate in order to represents the interests of the 
demos that often contradict those of the firm, but also effective in ensuring that the 
outcomes of deliberation are manifest in policy. Simply put, for this kind of deliberation to 
work, even within firms with the most sincere and enlightened management, there must be 
a powerful incentive for the firm to commit to a course of action that goes beyond a sense 
of moral obligation and is potentially antithetical to the traditional (or neo classical) purpose 
of the capitalist organisation. To be sure, any partner with which the firm engages in 
deliberation must have both a perspective that is contrasting with and independent of that 
of management (in order to arrive at action that reflects the views of stakeholders other 
than senior management), but also be effective in monitoring compliance with agreed 
initiatives and be capable of taking effective action in the event of noncompliance. The 
efficacy of the trade union is presented herein as the ability to communicate with and 
mobilise stakeholders both within and beyond the firm. Finally, the paper analyses the 
potential and pitfalls of trade union participation in CSR deliberation. Disaffection with this 
revised strategy among members of trade unions might be damaging to the labour 
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movement. The uncertainty over member reaction to this new role for their representations 
ensures that adoption of such a strategy is something of a gamble. Nevertheless, by 
wielding the ‘sword of justice’, trade union involvement in political CSR has the potential to 
attract members who would otherwise eschew trade union membership.  
20 
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